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The external financing of domestic government expenditures, as exemplified 
by the financing of social protection with official flows (aid and other official 
flows), faces what can be called a monetary transformation dilemma. This 
refers to the fact that official flows are in foreign currency and hence cannot be 
directly used for expenditures in domestic currency. Nor do domestic 
expenditures require foreign currency given that they can be financed through 
conventional domestic monetary and fiscal operations. The extent to which 
official flows are actually able to fund domestic expenditures therefore involves 
a range of macroeconomic management concerns, which are in turn prone to 
exacerbate the already thorny political relations between donors and recipient 
governments. This calls for a serious rethink of many of the accepted premises 
in the political economy of aid and social protection literatures, particularly 
with respect to the dominant focus on domestic governance rather than a 
broader systemic understanding of the often convoluted and contradictory 
external dynamics that domestic actors must contend with in the power 
relations that condition official flows.  
Several examples can be highlighted. First, conventional measures of 
absorption, as used by the IMF, actually include income payments to 
foreigners, which seriously muddles our understanding of the extent to which 
aid flows represent actual redistribution. Second, large mismatches between the 
absorption and notional domestic spending of aid appear to be the norm in 
most of the countries studied in the macroeconomic literature on aid and, 
given the first point, absorption is generally overestimated in this literature. 
Third, the full absorption and spending of aid, as advocated by the IMF, is in 
contradiction with the need to accumulate reserves in the face of financial 
account liberalisations, as also advocated by the IMF and other IFIs. Fourth, 
the full spending of aid is similarly in contradiction with substitutive 
approaches to social protection, as commonly advocated by donors and IFIs, 
which imply no net increase in spending. Finally, the obscurity of these 
monetary transformation dilemmas exacerbates donor concerns about 
fungibility, transparency and accountability, thereby inciting donors to seek 
ways of strengthening their micro-control over the end uses of aid, as 
exemplified by recent innovations in aid modalities such as cash-on-delivery or 
payment-by-results. Impulses to control recipient countries obviously do not 
originate from the monetary transformation dilemma although the associated 
tensions nonetheless reinforce broader ideological predilections to subordinate 
recipient countries within donor-recipient power relations, in parallel with 
increasingly conservative reactions to welfare in donor countries, thereby 
running counter to donor commitments of respecting national ownership.  
Keywords 
Aid (official development assistance); official flows; social protection; fiscal and 
monetary policy; political economy of development; international finance and 
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In these times of development goals, first millennial and now sustainable, the 
scope of official development assistance (aid for short) has been extended and 
deepened in an increasing array of policy sectors, mostly notably social sectors 
such as those dealing with health, education and social protection. However, 
within the increasing focus on such social expenditures, and within the debates 
regarding aid effectiveness more generally, a deceivingly simple question is 
almost never asked: how can aid, which is constituted as foreign currency, be 
used for domestic expenditures denominated in domestic currency? Or why 
should it be used for such purposes? With a few exceptions, the technicalities 
involved in such transfers have been overlooked as unproblematic within the 
profuse literature on aid and on finance for development or social protection. 
The few exceptions are found in a specialised tangent on the macroeconomics 
of aid largely associated with the IMF (e.g. see IMF 2005, Berg et al 2007, 
Hussain et al 2009, and Berg et al 2015). These have been formative in 
clarifying how the technicalities can be problematic, although their insights 
rarely seep through even other allied silos of economic research on aid, let 
alone those in other disciplines. The technicalities nonetheless tap into an 
unexplored potential to re-examine many of the accepted premises in the 
political economy literature on aid or social protection, particularly with respect 
to the role of external pressures at a time when many believe that the age of 
coercive conditionalities has been left behind. The current social protection 
agenda serves as an ideal policy case for such re-examination precisely because 
social protection expenditures are, in principle, mostly denominated in 
domestic currencies. 
As a first step in problematizing the conventionally assumed 
unproblematic, it is important to recall the fact that aid and net financial 
inflows are absorbed into domestic economies via trade deficits (ideally goods, 
but also services). In other words, the redistribution that aid is supposed to 
bring operates by allowing an excess of consumption and investment over 
production or earnings. This is not a theoretical proposition but a logical 
corollary derived from the balance of payments accounting identity. As such, it 
is well recognised by the IMF-associated literature mentioned above and was 
also an accepted premise in early development economics, as discussed by 
Fischer (2009, 2016). With respect to financial flows more generally, it is also 
well recognised by a range of post-Keynesian and structuralist economists 
dealing with macroeconomic and financial issues (e.g. see Thirwall 1979, 2010; 
or Kregel 2008), although these latter contributions rarely address the question 
of aid and are overlooked in the aid-related literature.  
The implication of this classic insight is that aid is managed as foreign 
currency on the external accounts of recipient countries and is supplied 
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primarily as a means to overcome foreign exchange constraints on 
development. This is distinct from domestic resources denominated in 
domestic currency, which various poor countries have often been quite 
successful in mobilising, in particular prior to the neoliberal era when countries 
could manage such matters behind relatively closed capital accounts.1 A 
fundamental problem with much of the contemporary aid literature is that this 
distinction is not recognized, as epitomised by Sachs et al (2004), whose case 
for aid on the basis of a savings-gap model does not differentiate foreign from 
domestic savings.2 The distinction is nonetheless vital for understanding the 
power levers that donors (including multilateral international financial 
institutions or IFIs) hold over recipient countries as strategic providers of 
foreign exchange, even in situations where aid and other official flows might 
only constitute a marginal addition to overall financing needs. This is 
particularly the case during tightening financial cycles when recipients face 
resurgent balance of payments constraints.  
From this perspective, when aid is directed towards expenditures that 
are denominated in domestic currency, the intended transfer elicits what might 
be called a dilemma of monetary transformation from external to domestic 
resources. The quandary is that foreign currency cannot be directly spent on 
expenditures denominated in domestic currency. Rather, the foreign currency 
provided by aid is necessarily used for other foreign exchange transactions or 
else is held in reserves. For countries that do not possess reserve currencies, 
the external uses of domestic currency are also very narrow and restricted, and 
foreign exchange must be earned, borrowed or given in order to pay for 
external transactions. Aid intended for domestic expenditures is, in this strict 
monetary sense, perfectly fungible.3 
In recent practice, receiving governments can either spend the foreign 
currency directly on imports or else sell the foreign exchange to the central 
bank in exchange for domestic currency, which can then be spent on domestic 
expenditures or else simply saved. In the latter exchange, the central bank in 
turn either sells or saves the foreign exchange. The aid is absorbed once the 
foreign exchange is used for imports, through whichever route. Spending 
therefore falls under the purview of fiscal policy. Absorption falls under the 
purview of monetary and exchange rate policy (if it follows the indirect route 
via the central bank). The exchange between the government and central bank 
in this sense is essentially equivalent to a domestic monetary expansion to 
finance a fiscal expansion.4 The differences are that: aid allows this to happen 
without the government incurring debt with the central bank; aid provides 
1 For instance, see Serieux (2011) for a discussion of the persistently low savings and 
investment rates in lower income Sub-Saharan African countries since the 1980s, in contrast to 
their higher rates in the 1960s and 1970s. 
2 As pointed out by UNCTAD (2008: 56), the model of Sachs et al (2004) also borders on 
tautology. 
3 Hussain et al (2009, p.494) also note that ‘[aid] money is fungible’ but they do not elaborate 
on this point, particularly in light of other literature on fungibility, as discussed later in this 
paper.  
4 Hussain et al (2009, p.492) make this point, but only with reference to cases where aid is not 
absorbed and the foreign exchange is held in reserves. 
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foreign exchange to buffer the balance of payments effects of fiscal and 
monetary expansion; and the extent to which the central bank allows 
absorption to occur through an increase in the non-aid trade deficit acts as the 
equivalent of sterilisation, thereby not requiring additional sterilization by the 
central bank.  
Despite these qualifications, the fact remains that the receiving 
government effectively does not need aid in order to finance domestic 
expenditures, insofar as it can finance these expenditures through conventional 
domestic channels. Rather, it needs aid to finance its direct foreign exchange 
expenditures or else to relieve the indirect foreign exchange constraints on the 
rest of the economy. To the extent that donors do not clearly conceptualize 
this distinction is already setting up aid relations to much confusion and 
contention. Also, to the extent that the absorption and notional spending of 
aid do not match, as is the case of most of the countries studied in the limited 
literature on these issues, the coordination between monetary and fiscal policy 
becomes potentially fraught with tensions. In particular, the inflationary and 
exchange rate implications of absorbing less than governments spend (which 
appears to be the norm) runs against a variety of orthodox concerns regarding 
macroeconomic policy, as suggested by Hussain et al (2009). It also 
undermines the redistributive purpose of aid. These implications are therefore 
prone to exacerbate the already thorny political relations between donors and 
recipients regarding a range of issues, from expectations regarding monetary 
and fiscal policy, and current and capital account management, to the course of 
domestic policy that is notionally associated with aid.  
While this transformation dilemma applies to any domestic 
expenditure, it is exemplified by social protection schemes such as cash 
transfers given that these are almost entirely in domestic currency (besides 
budget items such as technical assistance, which can nonetheless be substantial 
within certain programme budgets). Even without entering into a critique of 
the mainstream narrative regarding the virtues of cash transfers,5 the entry of 
donors into such domestic policy spheres complicates the political economy 
tensions surrounding both aid and social protection. This occurs not simply by 
their entry as one distinct faction within a political settlement, as argued by 
Hickey and Lavers (2016), but also through the convolution that arises from 
the transformation dilemma, which muddles the various incentives and 
compulsions guiding both external and domestic actors in often contradictory 
ways. Many of the political economy contortions that recipient governments 
manifest must be understood, in this sense, as symptoms of these convoluted 
and contradictory tensions, rather than as causes of aid ineffectiveness.  
In particular, because transfers from foreign to domestic resources are 
indirect, opaque, negotiated, generally in disequilibrium, and widely 
misunderstood, they have a strong propensity to exacerbate donor concerns 
about fungibility, transparency and accountability. Bolstered by a priori 
assumptions of the virtues of such types of aid, these concerns arguably incite 
5 For some critiques, see Mkandawire (2005), Adesina (2010), Fischer (2012), Lavinas (2013), 
and Saad-Filho (2016).   
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donors to seek ways of strengthening their control over the end uses of aid 
and/or intervening in domestic policy making as a means of dealing with the 
opacity and complexity of the intermediating financial processes. Obviously, 
impulses to control recipient countries do not originate from these tensions, 
but have long standing roots in colonial and post-colonial histories, especially 
since the neoliberal phase of structural adjustment programmes and beyond. 
However, the tensions associated with the obfuscating effects of the monetary 
transformation dilemma nonetheless reinforce the broader ideological 
predilections to subordinate recipient countries with donor-recipient power 
relations, in parallel with increasingly conservative reactions to welfare in 
donor countries, thereby running counter to donor commitments of respecting 
national ownership.  
The implications of the monetary transformation dilemma within the 
context of social expenditures therefore offers an unexplored lens for a serious 
rethink of many of the accepted premises in the political economy of aid and 
related literatures, particularly with respect to power relations between donors 
and recipient countries in global aid practices. Such rethinking is explored in 
this paper, with the objective to gain a deeper appreciation of the systemic 
political as well as economic challenges facing global redistribution towards 
poorer countries. The first section provides background on the relationship of 
aid to external constraints. The second explores how the increasing emphasis 
of domestic expenditures by donors and IFIs exacerbates the monetary 
transformation dilemma. The third critically discusses how the monetary 
transformation dilemma has been implicitly conceived in the specialised 
macroeconomics of aid literature, together with some critiques of this 
literature. The fourth examines the blind spot in the general aid, social 
protection, or finance for development literatures with regard to these issues 
and suggests some of the unexplored implications. The article concludes by 
stressing the urgency of engaging in this rethinking given the currently 
tightening financial cycle and the re-emergence of stringent balance of 
payments constraints facing many developing countries, parallel to the ongoing 
emphasis of social expenditures by donors, IFIs, and global development 
agendas. 
1 Aid and the external constraints of  development 
The role of the trade deficit in the absorption of countervailing flows on the 
balance of payments has long been a subject of notice in economics. Modern 
iterations stretch back to interwar and post-war apprehensions regarding 
international economic imbalances. Pre-war orthodoxy maintained that such 
imbalances were best resolved through strict gold standards and market-
mediated clearances, although this position was severely discredited by the 
interwar experience in the 1920s and 1930s, particularly in the European 
peripheries, as discussed at length by both John Maynard Keynes and Karl 
Polanyi.6 The post-war Marshall Plan in turn came to epitomise the ideal of 
6 See Polanyi-Levitt (2006).  
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how official financial flows could work to mediate these imbalances, following 
severe balance of payments problems in Europe due to the import intensity of 
immediate post-war reconstruction. Notably, while the Marshall Plan has often 
been criticised as merely guaranteeing the purchase of US exports as well as the 
repayment of US loans, it was precisely in this financial dynamic that its 
redistributive function was founded. 
These concerns and experiences were also clearly articulated in 
emerging field of development economics with respect to the tendency of late 
industrialisation to generate trade deficits, thereby resulting in similar balance 
of payments constraints. As discussed in Fischer (2009), late industrialization 
and related development processes such as urbanization and the modernisation 
of consumption in the post-war era have usually resulted in chronic trade 
deficits for structural reasons, given that these processes are typically very 
import-intensive and structural/technological dependence results in a strong 
inelasticity of imports to growth, in particular with respect to capital-intensive 
and intermediate imports. Economic development (conceived with 
industrialisation at its core) is therefore constrained by the supply of foreign 
exchange to finance such deficits. Conversely, trade surpluses have generally 
been associated with austerity (and honouring international creditors) rather 
than development throughout most of the post-war era,7 except in cases of 
exceptional commodity booms. The choice has generally been between trade 
deficits balanced by some counterpart net inflow, such as aid, debt, or foreign 
direct investment (FDI), or else choking growth by way of stunting or 
crippling industrialisation and related processes. This is in addition to the 
broader constraints and challenges involved in processes of late development, 
as amply discussed, for instance, in the more contemporary literature on 
industrial policy or developmental states. The recognition of these ‘trade gaps’ 
or foreign exchange constraints was common among the pioneers of 
development economics, such as Prebisch (1950), Lewis (1955), or Hirschman 
(1958), as well as in the later formalisation of ‘two-gap’ modeling associated with 
Chenery and Strout (1966). Contemporary recollections of these insights mostly 
refer back only to these later authors, while also de-emphasising if not entirely 
overlooking the centrality of industrialisation in these earlier theorisations.8 
The classical rational for aid in early development economics was built 
on this understanding, complemented by the fact that aid absorption 
effectively requires deficits. Indeed, Chenery and Strout (1966) explicitly 
presented their two-gap model as a justification for aid. Fischer (2016) refers to 
7 For instance, this was the case in the immediate aftermath of the Latin American debt crisis 
in the early 1980s, as seminally discussed by Diaz Alejandro (1984).  
8 For instance, Morrissey (2001: 39-40), Addison et al (2005), and Serieux (2011) all refer back 
to the Chenery models rather than the earlier origins of these ideas and also do not explicitly 
relate these to industrialisation. Thirlwall (2011), on the other hand, offers a more 
comprehensive survey of these earlier approaches, including the pioneers before Chenery, 
although he also does not explicitly place industrialization strategies at the centre of his analysis 
and also does not deal with the subject of aid. Indeed, the more recent post-Keynesian and 
structuralist contributions on these financial questions have found little if any inroad into the 
aid literature in part because they do not explicitly or specifically address aid (with the 
exception of Fischer 2009). 
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this as the symbiosis of redistribution and development, insofar as aid provides 
concessional and stable flows of foreign currency to poor countries in order to 
fund their external expenditures that emerge as requisites of economic 
development. The symbiosis does not solve the question of what causes 
development, but it highlights that aid, in its ideal form, at least removes the 
impediments for these causes to operate. The key condition that renders aid 
developmental in this sense is its confluence with productionist industrial 
policies and their tendency to generate trade deficits.  
This is strongly evidenced, for instance, by the case of South Korea. 
The country ran very deep trade deficits from the 1950s right up to the mid-
1980s, as reflective of its intense and rapid state-led industrialisation. It 
arguably only survived this hard constraint through generous supplies of 
foreign currency, first almost entirely through aid in the 1950s and then, as aid 
gradually tapered off in the 1960s and 1970s, through indirect support (such as 
demand for government services by the US military) and, more importantly, 
through generous supplies of official loans from the US and Japan (see Fischer 
2016 for further detail). Ample supplies of aid and debt also allowed 
industrialisation to take place mostly on the basis of national ownership, as 
seminally emphasised by Amsden (1989), whereas FDI was very marginal 
before the 1980s. The experience of Taiwan differed in that the country 
managed to balance its trade earlier, by the mid-1970s, although it also ran 
deep trade deficits until then. It also relied much more on FDI from the mid-
1960s onwards, although this was careful regulated behind closed capital 
accounts and was also supplemented by heavy doses of aid, as in South Korea.9  
In the absence of industrialisation, aid mostly plays a welfare role of 
assisting countries to sustain consumption, particularly in the face of the 
cyclical import austerity that is characteristic of primary commodity producers. 
Such tendencies for austerity are driven by the secular trends of declining terms 
of trade faced by such economies, combined with various outflows of wealth 
that derive from their subordinate position within the international economic 
order (e.g. see Fischer 2015). The new orthodox hope since the 1980s has been 
that the demand generated from aid-augmented consumption, if conjoined 
with liberalisation and deregulation, would catalyse economic transformation 
led by the private sector through market adhering principles (based on the 
assumption that past attempts at economic transformation failed because of 
distortionary government interventions). However, as amply pointed out by 
numerous authors from both sides of the spectrum in the recent aid literature, 
such hopes have stood in stark contrast to actual experience.  
Moreover, the new orthodoxy since the 1980s has implicitly tended to 
admonish trade deficits in developing countries. The theoretical position of 
this new orthodoxy actually postulates the opposite, that under liberalised 
conditions, finance should flow from rich capital abundant countries to poor 
capital scarce countries due to the presumed higher rates of profit in the latter, 
which implies trade deficits. Indeed, it is for this reason that the previous 
9 For data on Taiwan, see Hsiao and Hsiao (2001). On the careful regulation of FDI, see Wade 
(1990).   
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structuralist arguments are often conflated as part of this neoclassical 
theorising, even though their reasoning about the causes of trade deficits 
differs. Nonetheless, despite this orthodox theorising, trade deficits are 
implicitly admonished in practice through the pricing of perceived risk in 
commercial sovereign debt markets and also rhetorically through the 
exhortation of export-oriented strategies of development.  
Underlying the practice and rhetoric is the flip in the external 
imbalances of the US economy, which went from trade surpluses and hence 
net financial outflows during the first three decades of the post-war period, to 
running deep trade deficits and net financial inflows since the 1980s. As noted 
by Arrighi (2003), this made it much more difficult for peripheral developing 
countries to run trade deficits and to compete with the US for international 
finance. It has been precisely in this context that the option of using trade 
surpluses rather than deficits to drive development has emerged (through 
augmented external demand rather than net financial inflows).10 This is 
exemplified by the experience of China since the late 1990s, although 
interpreting this experience is nonetheless tricky due to the fact that China ran 
both current and non-reserve financial account surpluses during this period.11 
Besides major oil-exporters with small populations, most other countries have 
had much more tenuous experiences in running trade surpluses rather than 
deficits, in part because of the inherent tendency for economic development to 
intensify demand for imports and external finance, which tends to reassert 
deficits either once austerity is relaxed or exceptional external demand 
circumstances subside. Trade liberalisation has also accentuated this tendency 
given the increasing demand for non-essential consumer imports that typically 
accompanies liberalisation. The resultant deficits can be typically sustained in 
periods of surging international liquidity, such as in the 1970s and in the 
noughties up to about 2013. However, when such conditions subside, external 
constraints usually return with a vengeance, as we have been observing for an 
increasingly number of developing countries since 2013. This is especially the 
case given that periods of surging financial inflows generally have an effect of 
accentuating the structural import-intensity and dependence of these 
economies.  
The admonishment of trade deficits in practice is relevant for questions 
of aid because, in the absence of trade deficits, aid is effectively not absorbed. 
Instead, it adds to the countervailing imbalance, thereby accentuating the 
outflows on the income or financial accounts that are implied by a trade 
surplus. In such circumstances, the justification for aid might reside in its 
hypothetical knowledge transfer, innovative, or demonstration effects, but the 
redistributive justification is effectively nullified. Indeed, as argued in Fischer 
(2009), a huge weakness in most of the aid effectiveness literature is the lack of 
consideration of the place of aid within broader balance of payments 
structures. In other words, aid can hardly be expected to be effective in a 
macroeconomic sense if it is not absorbed. 
10 See Kregel (2008) for a discussion of these two approaches.  
11 See Fischer (2010) and Yu (2013) for interpretations of this recent Chinese experience. 
12 
 
                                                 
2 Aid for domestic expenditures, as exemplified by social 
spending 
This foundational understanding of the role of aid is important because it 
clarifies a particularly potent range of external constraints faced by developing 
country governments in their attempts to execute various development 
strategies, which have been mostly ignored in the contemporary aid and 
political economy of development literatures. It also helps to clarify what I call 
the ‘monetary transformation dilemma’ when aid is oriented towards domestic 
instead of external expenditures, as explained further in the subsequent section. 
The earmarking of various domestic expenditures, social or otherwise, 
has obviously been a feature of aid for a long time. It has also been a common 
feature of general budget support (GBS), which is often justified in terms of 
easing the macroeconomic complexities of managing aid flows towards 
domestic uses (e.g. see Hussain et al 2009). As such, there is nothing new about 
the dilemmas associated with such uses of aid, at least since the emergence of 
programme aid in the mid-1980s (e.g. see Wuyts et al 2016 for a discussion of 
project versus programme aid).  
However, the complexities associated with aid for domestic 
expenditures have become more prominent due to the increased emphasis of 
such items since the 1980s. These are reflected by the rise of the ‘social 
infrastructure and services’ sector, which increased from 25 percent of total aid 
flows from all official donors in 1990 to around 40 percent by 2007, after 
which it plateaued at around this upper level, according to the OECD DAC 
data on committed ODA (see figure 1). In nominal terms, it more than tripled  
FIGURE 1 
 Committed Official Development Assistance decomposed by sector,  
as defined and estimated by OECD/DAC 
 




from 21 billion USD in 2000 to 67 billion USD by 2012. This sector includes a 
large range of items, such as aid supporting governance, human rights, and 
ending violence against women, alongside social policy items such as 
education, health and social security/welfare. 
The characteristic feature of most of these categories is their lack of 
any obvious need for foreign currency beyond so-called technical assistance (or 
consultancy services) from foreign experts. Health is one obvious exception, 
insofar as this sector requires substantial imported goods and services in most 
low-income countries (e.g. see Wuyts et al 2016). Tertiary education is another, 
particularly in matters related to science, technology and engineering, which are 
all key to industrial policy (e.g. see Mkandawire 2000; Lall and Pietrobelli 2005; 
Reddy 2011). Otherwise, there is a dissonance within this sector between the 
categories targeted by aid and the extent to which these categories actually 
need aid.  
Conversely, the shift of aid away from ‘production’ and ‘economic 
infrastructure and services’ sectors over this same period also reduced 
categories that would more clearly require foreign currency as a direct 
consequence of aid spending. Aid to ‘production sectors’ fell from 25 percent 
of aid flows in 1980, to 15 percent in 1990, and then to a trough of about 6 
percent in the mid-2000s, Similarly, aid to ‘economic infrastructure and 
services’ fell from around 25 percent of aid flows in the early-to-mid 1990s to a 
trough of 12 percent by 2006. Subsequently, both sectors partially recovered 
up to 2012 – economic infrastructure to 21 percent and production sectors to 
10 percent – which reflects the slight restoration of mainstream consensus 
back in favour of infrastructure spending in particular (that is, infrastructure in 
the service of market-led international trade and private foreign direct 
investment). Nonetheless, the persisting primacy of the social sector remains 
evident. 
The shift away from the production sector in particular reflects the bias 
against industrial policy and other forms of publicly funded intervention in 
investment, production and trade that has characterized the neoliberal era from 
the early 1980s onwards, when the emphasis of aid shifted from investment to 
poverty reduction (see a discussion of this by Wuyts et al 2016). However, this 
only became apparent in the ODA data in the 1990s. Indeed, the sharpest drop 
in aid to production sectors occurred in 1990 and appears to have been closely 
related to debt relief, which spiked in the same year. This most likely reflects 
the effects of the Brady Plan, which proved much more successful than the 
previous Baker Plan in drawing countries – at least those in Latin America – to 
adopt structural adjustment programmes. Along with the additional drop in the 
share of aid allocated to the economic sector, the trend was reinforced during 
subsequent financial crises in the 1990s. These corresponded with the 
increasing emphasis of governance-related aid expenditures in the 1990s under 
the so-called post-Washington Consensus, as well as the increasing focus on 
poverty reduction (both categories would be mostly recorded under the social 
sector). The latter emphasis on poverty reduction was then deepened further 
with the advent of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which 
focused predominantly on social protection, health or education.  
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Whether ideological or opportunistic in motive, the fact that these 
shifts in aid corresponded with successive financial crises suggests an 
underlying impulse to separate, at least notionally, the supply of foreign 
exchange from the intended uses of aid in order to facilitate the diversion of 
the former to other uses.12 These other uses would have principally been debt-
servicing and, as foreign finance revived in the 1990s and again in the 2000s, 
other factor income payments to foreign investors. Such motives would have 
been more explicit in the 1980s, driven by concerns of rationing scarce foreign 
currency in the context of debt crises followed by austerity, stabilization and 
then SAPs.  
Indeed, the impulse to conserve foreign currency would have driven 
shifts away from items in foreign currency even within the social infrastructure 
and services sector, as was implicit in the strong shift of aid away from tertiary 
education and towards primary education. While this was wrapped up in a 
variety of (contested) theoretical and empirical arguments regarding the more 
efficient and equitable use of aid or public expenditure in primary education,13 
the shift (and the compliance of governments) can also be understood in terms 
of the need to ration foreign exchange given that the foreign exchange needs 
of tertiary education can be quite substantial whereas those of primary 
education minimal. Similar objectives became more obscured with the 
emergence of the new poverty agenda in the 1990s and the MDGs and beyond 
from 2000 onwards. However, the underlying function has remained, insofar 
as the social protection policies that are currently popular with donors, such as 
cash transfers, are similarly rationalised by economic efficiency arguments and 
are in principle entirely constituted of domestic expenditures. 
3   The macroeconomic management of  aid for domestic 
expenditures 
Within the classical approach to aid – that is, aid as understood to be financing 
external expenditures, whether directly or indirectly – the macroeconomic 
management of aid is relatively straightforward. Aid that is directly used by a 
government for its foreign currency expenditures technically has no domestic 
monetary and fiscal impact, except by way of easing the foreign exchange 
constraints of the government. The foreign exchange in question would be 
simply held in dollar accounts of the central bank and used directly to pay for 
foreign exchange expenditures of the government (e.g. paying for government 
purchases of imports, paying for technical assistance or outsourced 
government functions to foreign consultancy firms, or paying interest or 
12 See Wuyts et al (2016) for a related discussion of the emergence of programme aid in the 
mid-1980s, discussed within the context of Tanzania.  
13 E.g. see Psacharopoulos (1981, 1985, 1994) and WB (1994). See Mkandawire (2000, 2005) 
and Mamdani (2007) for critical assessments of these arguments and the debilitating effects 
that reduced expenditures had on African universities. In particular, the undermining of 
African universities ironically undercut their capacity to supply skilled labour to even primary 




                                                 
amortisation on public debt, etc.). Or, with project aid before the mid-1980s, 
this foreign exchange transaction for imports was often even directly managed 
by the donor in negotiation with the government, as discussed by Wuyts et al 
(2016). In this manner, the aid is not coordinated through foreign exchange 
markets or domestic monetary operations. Indeed, this point is briefly made by 
Hussain et al (2009, p.493) with respect to the exchange rate, price level and 
interest rate impacts of such direct use of aid. However, they then assert 
without justification that the more indirect exchange between governments and 
central banks is the more relevant case (see below) and deal no further with the 
former, which is the position that is maintained in most of the related 
literature. Nonetheless, this scenario of direct use clearly demonstrates how the 
classical understanding of aid as covering government foreign exchange needs 
is also associated with the least complicated macroeconomic management 
implications.  
Even in the case of indirect mediation, aid would also have limited 
domestic monetary impact when its use is closely coordinated with the foreign 
currency expenditure needs of the economy, possibly even outside foreign 
exchange markets, to the extent that it is fully absorbed via increased imports 
within a short time lag. Such coordination is facilitated by relatively closed 
capital accounts, which allow the monetary authorities to mediate between 
scarce supplies of foreign currency and domestic needs and demands. 
Examples are thus largely confined to the early decades of the post-war period, 
prior to widespread capital account liberalisations, when the control and 
rationing of foreign exchange by developing countries was viewed as a norm. 
This probably also explains why these cases are ignored in the contemporary 
IMF-associated literature. Again, South Korea up to the 1980s provides the 
model example given that the government rationed and allocated foreign 
exchange – especially the foreign exchange supplied by aid – to supply 
particular prioritised investment projects.14 Comparable practices were 
commonplace in a wide variety of other cases as well, to the extent that donors 
even directly handled the designated import purchases, as discussed by Wuyts 
et al (2016). 
More arms-length transactions between governments and central banks 
have nonetheless become the norm in the more contemporary setting, 
especially with the rise of programme aid since the mid-1980s. This is 
particularly the case where explicit associations of aid to foreign exchange 
transactions by the government are discouraged, as epitomised by aid directed 
towards domestic expenditures. The separation is reinforced by rules regarding 
central bank independence or capital account openness, both of which strongly 
discourage governments from intervening in the allocation of foreign 
exchange, ostensibly leaving this to open market operations. Such 
circumstances are the exclusive focus of Hussain et al (2009) and the related 
IMF-associated literature, and as these authors elaborate, they add a degree of 
complexity to the macroeconomic management of aid.  
14 For instance, see discussions of this in Amsden (1989). Bangura (2015) also notes that aid in 
East Asia supported productive activities and economic infrastructure.   
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The complexity relates to what can be referred to as a dilemma of 
monetary transformation from external to domestic resources, given that 
foreign currency cannot be directly spent on expenditures denominated in 
domestic currency. This is essentially the inverse of what Keynes (1929) once 
identified as the transfer problem, with reference to Germany’s need to pay 
reparations through current account surpluses rather than simply through the 
accumulation and conversion of the local currency (as noted by Hussain et al 
2009, p.508; see also Milesi-Ferreti and Lane 2004). In the case of aid, the 
inverse quandary is that foreign currency cannot be directly spent on 
expenditures denominated in domestic currency. Rather, the foreign currency 
provided by aid is necessarily used for other foreign exchange transactions or 
else is held in reserves, whereas the domestic expenditures are financed 
through domestic monetary and fiscal operations. In other words, for countries 
that do not possess reserve currencies, there is effectively a partition between 
the two monetary circulations.15 The external uses of domestic currency are 
similarly very narrow and restricted, and foreign exchange must be earned, 
borrowed or given in order to pay for external transactions. The transfer of aid 
to domestic uses must therefore be mediated, which implicates a coordination 
between monetary, exchange rate and fiscal policy. Aid intended for domestic 
expenditures is, in this strict monetary sense, perfectly fungible.16  
The practice, as generally characterised in the literature, is that a 
recipient government (i.e. the finance ministry) sells the foreign currency to the 
central bank in exchange for domestic currency, which can be used to finance 
domestic expenditures or else simply saved. The central bank in turn either 
sells or saves the foreign exchange (i.e. reserves), and then also might engage in 
sterilisation operations in the event that it saves. In an apogee of work on these 
issues in the IMF in the mid-to-late noughties, Hussain et al (2009) framed this 
as a balance between absorption and spending. Absorption refers to the degree 
to which an increase in aid is associated with an increase in the non-aid trade 
deficit, according to the classic logic as discussed in the first section. As such, 
absorption falls largely under the purview of monetary and exchange rate 
policy, managed by central banks in terms of the amount of foreign exchange 
they are willing to sell in order to allow for an increase in the trade deficit. 
Spending is the degree to which recipient governments match the foreign 
exchange received through an increase in the non-aid fiscal deficit (either 
through increased spending or reduced taxation). Notably, this conception is 
based on macroeconomic aggregates whereby these outcomes occur through 
either direct or indirect secondary effects of aid inflows as they circulate within 
foreign exchange markets and/or the corresponding domestic money supply 
circulates within the domestic economy.  
15 Reserve currencies break down this partition. For instance, the US can pay its foreign 
expenditures with the money it issues rather than the foreign currencies it saves, which is 
widely attributed as a form of international seigneurage. Indeed, this is a central difference 
between central and peripheral monetary systems in the international economic order.  
16 Hussain et al (2009, p.494) also note that ‘[aid] money is fungible’ but they do not elaborate 




                                                 
Intergovernmental transfers are also implicit in this conception. Cases 
where donors maintain control over aid expenditures are not considered, such 
as is typical in non-governmental aid projects and even some bilateral projects 
involving off-budget aid. In such cases, aid transfers are presumably made 
through open market transactions and the increase in spending occurs 
privately, that is, not on the government budget. This renders such aid 
modalities more difficult for governments to evaluate in terms of aggregate 
levels of absorption and spending in the economy. Keeping this in mind, the 
conception discussed here is in terms of those flows that governments do 
control, which are also the flows that have the strongest influence on policy 
making.   
The exchange between the government and central bank is effectively 
equivalent to a monetary expansion to finance a fiscal deficit. Correspondingly, 
the degree to which the central bank allows aid flows to be absorbed by selling 
the foreign exchange is equivalent to sterilisation, given that domestic money 
supply is soaked up by the central bank in the process (whereas open market 
purchases of foreign exchange do not reduce money supply). Hence, when 
absorption does not occur, then the former is effectively the same as a 
domestic monetary-fiscal operation in the absence of aid, except that foreign 
reserves are accumulated, as noted by Hussain et al (2009, p.495). As 
highlighted in the subsequent debate between Adam et al (2009), Buffie et al 
(2010) and Berg et al (2015), an additional issue faced by central banks in the 
event that aid is saved as reserves is the question of whether and how much to 
sterilise the resultant monetary effects of spending but not absorbing, with the 
orthodox position advocating fiscal restraint (e.g. see Buffie et al).  
In this sense, aid is effectively not needed to finance fiscal deficits in 
domestic currency, although it nonetheless provides for a few advantages over 
purely domestic operations. One is that the monetary transfer from the central 
bank to the government occurs through selling the foreign exchange provided 
by aid rather than through selling government debt, thereby avoiding an 
increase in the public debt owed to the central bank (although the degree to 
which this distinction is important can be debated). By the same token, it 
avoids the crowding out effects of raising funds through public bond issues, if 
the government would instead choose this option to finance a deficit (again, 
the crowding out effect is debated and could in any case occur through 
sterilisation policies). Second, aid provides the foreign exchange to deal with 
the balance of payments consequences of increased government spending or 
money supply, particularly in economies with strong and inelastic demand for 
imports. Lastly, aid correspondingly allows for the option of sterilising the 
monetary expansion via absorption, as described above, whereas a purely 
domestic monetary expansion does not provide the foreign exchange for this 
course of action. Of course, all of these qualifications bring us back to the 
classic conception of aid as strategically addressing the external constraints of 
development, as discussed in the first section.  
In the ideal case when aid is fully absorbed and also completely spent 
in the corresponding government budget, the macroeconomic effects of aid 
would be limited to a range of short-run adjustments (domestic monetary and 
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fiscal effects obviously do not occur when aid is neither absorbed nor spent). 
As explained by Hussain et al (2009), these would occur through the lag 
between an increase in domestic and foreign money supply, versus the 
compensating increase in the trade deficit. This theoretically results in a 
tendency for higher price inflation and perhaps some real and/or nominal 
currency appreciation (although the higher price inflation might also bring a 
tendency for currency depreciation, depending on how this is managed). These 
presumed effects could of course be debated although no cases in their study 
fit this ideal of full absorption and full spending in any case.  
As Hussain et al elaborate, the macroeconomic management of aid is 
more complex when absorption and spending do not match. In the one case of 
their study when absorption exceeded spending during an aid surge (Ethiopia 
from 2001-03), this appears to have been motivated by domestic stabilisation 
concerns and retiring public debt. Alternatively, increased spending in the 
absence of absorption has an expansionary domestic effect, theoretically 
bringing the potential for domestic price inflation and possibly some exchange 
rate depreciation, depending on how various policy factors are managed. The 
choice to not absorb appears to be motived by the objective of accumulating 
reserves and/or maintaining external competitiveness.  
Indeed, the latter pattern (spending exceeding absorption) characterises 
most of the cases studied in this literature. For instance, Hussain et al (2009) 
identified one case (Ghana, 2001-03) where aid was not absorbed and barely 
spent and three out of five where spending was substantially more than 
absorption. Similarly, Martins (2011) observed on the basis of a cointegration 
analysis spanning 25 low-income African countries from 1980 to 2005 that, on 
average, around two-thirds of aid was absorbed in the short term while most 
was spent (for what it is worth, he observed almost full absorption in the ‘long-
run’). On average, therefore, the predominant trend has been for at least part 
of the foreign currency received from aid flows to be directed into reserves (or 
other financial account uses), more than matched by spending and hence with 
the effect of monetary expansion (unless of course subsequent sterilization is 
practiced). 
3.1 Some critical reflections on this literature 
There are serious conceptual and methodological problems with these studies, 
although these problems only accentuate the disjunctures observed between 
absorption and spending. The main problem is that all of these studies measure 
absorption in terms of the overall non-aid current account, even though they 
conceptualise absorption in terms of the trade account, as per the classic 
insights discussed in the first section. For instance, Hussain et al (2009) briefly 
rationalize absorption in terms of imports and trade deficits (p.492-93), but 
they then generalize this to currency account deficits for the rest of the article 
and empirically measure absorption in terms of non-aid current account 
deficits, not trade deficits. They refer to exports at another point (p.498), but 
only in terms of real effective exchange rates, not trade balances. Martins 
(2011) adopts the same convention, along with most of the IMF-associated 
work on these issues.  
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This conceptual slip is important because of the dominant role of the 
primary income account in the current account, and even the non-government 
secondary income account (following BPM6 reporting conventions; previously 
the current transfers account). From a redistributive or developmental point of 
view, the bulk of the primary income account is better understood as akin to 
financial account outflows, at least those parts that are attributed to remitted 
profits or interest payments on debt, precisely because these represent factor 
payments to foreigners rather consumption or investment. Indeed, Serieux 
(2011) includes these as part of his measure of ‘reverse flows’, together with a 
variety of measures on the financial account (e.g. he refers to these as debt 
servicing, capital flight and reserve accumulation, although his inclusion of 
reserves into the mix is arguably not appropriate).17 In sum, he suggests almost 
half of aid between 1980 to 2006 was used to finance such reverse flows. 
Direct causal attribution is difficult to make, in terms whether aid directly 
contributes to or accentuates such outflows rather than simply adding to the 
stock of foreign exchange that is subsequently used for such purposes. Indeed, 
if such outflows are a necessary and relatively constant feature of these 
countries, then it might be argued that they should not matter in the aggregate 
given that the concern is whether an increased availability of aid increases 
import capacity beyond these regular outflows. This is a testable proposition, 
although the use of aggregated current accounts rather than disaggregated trade 
and income accounts evades the test.  
Rather, in using the current account, it is not clear whether the 
purported measure for absorption is properly reflecting an increase in the trade 
deficit (financed via a surplus in current transfers), or else whether an increase 
in aid is actually offsetting an increase in the primary income account deficit. 
For instance, the latter scenario might occur when the increased supply of 
foreign currency is prioritized by the private sector for profit remittances or 
debt servicing rather than imports. This situation might happen, for instance, if 
aid is supplied contingent on or parallel to IFI conditionalities regarding 
financial account liberalization and/or tight monetary policies, both of which 
have been associated with surges of financial inflows and subsequent increases 
in interest or profit remitting outflows. Akyuz (2015b) also notes that non-
repatriated profits are recorded as primary income outflows and then as FDI 
inflows on the financial account even though they technically do not represent 
any cross-border transaction or fresh inflows of foreign currency, which 
further obfuscates the assessment of absorption. These points highlight the 
importance of assessing aid flows relative to other disaggregated flows on the 
external accounts, which in many cases might dwarf the magnitude of aid 
flows.  
Even within trade, the services account also includes many payments to 
foreigners that have a questionable developmental function. Many instead 
reflect classic structural attributes of dependent patterns of integration into the 
17 Even though reserves are treated as a financial outflow and, in most cases, are stored in low 
yielding assets, they nonetheless remain as assets under public (central bank) ownership and 




                                                 
international economy dominated by foreign corporations, such as royalty 
payments, payments to foreign finance, insurance and real estate sectors, or 
transport dominated by foreign firms. Other payments such as technical 
assistance or consultancy services might possess some developmental 
attributes, although questions have also been raised about the efficacy of the 
substantial shares of committed aid that end up as these forms of payment. 
Many of these payments effectively never leave the donor countries, such as 
when a donor agency directly transfers aid funds to one of a myriad range of 
consultancy firms vying over such lucrative contracts in the donor country (e.g. 
DFID funding to Adam Smith Institute, PWC or Deloitte in the UK, etc.). 
Whether or not such aid expenditures result in beneficial developmental 
contributions, they effectively have no redistributive monetary function. 
However, according to recent IMF reporting conventions, they are actually 
reported on the secondary income account as if they do represent a cross-
border flow of funds given that the transfer in kind is valued in monetary 
terms (e.g. see IMF 2014, p.237).18 Even if contracted by the recipient 
government and hence involving at least a nominal cross-border flow, such as 
when a government is required by the terms of an aid or financing agreement 
to internationally tender an economic and social impact assessment, the 
outflow on the service account would be more or less an automatic 
consequence of the aid exchange. All of such transfers of technical assistance 
or consultancy services would be included in the calculus of absorption.  
Moreover, dynamics on the trade, income or other accounts might 
have little to do with aid per se and estimated aid absorption in this sense might 
be as much a matter of coincidence as of conscious macroeconomic planning. 
For instance, loose international financial conditions might facilitate a large 
expansion of trade deficits given the easy availability of debt to finance such 
deficits. Similarly, an increase of FDI in mining would generally involve an 
increase in imports directly associated to the execution of the investment, 
particularly in large, capital-intensive enclave projects typically conducted by 
transnational firms. If these situations coincide with an increase in aid (as it has 
since the mid-noughties), this can give the appearance of strong aid absorption 
even though it is largely related to these other non-aid processes.19 Inversely, 
18 Note that this contradicts the assertion made by Martins (2011) that the use of BoP avoids 
the inclusion of technical assistance into aid estimates (see below). According to IMF (2014, 
p.237), ‘[c]osts incurred in the donors economy should be included in the value of technical 
assistance’ recorded on the balance of payment of the recipient country, given that it is treated 
as a transfer in kind.  
19 Indeed, this type of attribution problem is symptomatic in the econometric cross-country 
literature on aid effectiveness more generally. For instance, a dilemma that is rarely recognized 
is how to deal with the relative weights and the causal significance of various variables within 
each case, rather than simply the weighting of cases. For instance, if aid effectiveness is treated 
along the lines of a multiplier effect, with or without time lags, then countries with strong 
performance and where aid is relatively insignificant (such as China or India) would have a 
strong effect on determining a positive association between aid and performance even though 
aid ostensibly had no causal effect on performance in these cases. Similarly, countries receiving 
relatively large amounts of aid but with poor performance due to factors unrelated to aid (such 
as Sub-Saharan African countries during the lost decades of the 1980s and 1990s) would have a 
strong effect on determining a negative association between aid and performance, even 
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import capacity on the current account might also be related to contractions on 
the financial account, as was typical in the 1980s and late 1990s, or to 
collapsing terms of trade or demand in the few commodities that dominate a 
country’s exports, as was again typical in the 1980s and even through much of 
the 1990s, depending on the commodity. 
Depending on the case, these considerations can have major 
consequences on evaluations of absorption. To take the example of Zambia, 
the country went through an aid surge from about 2006 to 2013, when general 
government credits on the secondary income account were close to or 
exceeded around 400 million USD a year. At the same time, however, the 
goods trade surplus actually increased over these years, implying the opposite 
of absorption. This was obviously due to strong copper exports driven by high 
commodity prices, although it nonetheless indicates that aid absorption was 
not occurring through this channel. Instead, the services account deficit 
worsened significantly, driven by strong increases in freight transport debits, 
which rose from 208 million USD in 2006 to 742 million USD in 2013, 
reflective of the fact that the servicing of the commodity boom was dominated 
by foreign corporations. In this sense, one could plausibly argue that the 
increases in aid essentially compensated the international shipping industry. 
The primary income account remained in strong deficit, typically in excess of 
one billion USD a year and in some years exceeding the goods surplus. It was 
dominated by direct investment incomes, as would be expected by an export 
sector (copper) that is dominated by foreign enterprises, although to make 
evaluation even more difficult, the reinvested portion of this was very volatile. 
As a result, the non-aid current account deficit swung in and out of deficit, in 
some years perhaps implying absorption, although not absorption in the sense 
implied by the literature. Moreover, despite oscillation on both the current and 
financial accounts during these years, the central bank nonetheless accumulated 
reserves in every year besides 2013, in 2009 by more than one and a half times 
the amount of aid received.  
From this example, it is clear how evaluating absorption by using 
aggregated non-aid current account balances puts into serious question even 
the limited amounts of absorption that are typically measured. For instance, 
given the heavy debt loads faced by African countries in the period studied by 
Hussain et al (2009) in the late 1990s and early 2000s, deficits on primary 
income accounts generally far outweighed aid flows and were in the same 
proportion as trade balances. The even longer period studied by Martins (2011) 
extends into the 1980s, when interest payments on debt were substantially 
rising in most of the low income African countries of his study, well beyond 
the balances registered in trade or else the meager amounts of aid received 
(Zambia is again a case in point). Hence the suggestion that aid was absorbed 
in such a context is misleading given that the estimated absorption would 
largely reflect rising interest payments on external debt or else other 
remittances to foreigners.  
though, again, the association was ostensibly not due to aid but to much broader factors such 
as commodity crises, debt crisis, or structural adjustment programmes.  
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In these studies, deducting income account deficits from the non-aid 
current account would have resulted in significantly lower estimates of purely 
trade-based absorption and thus higher discrepancies with spending. Again, as 
mentioned previously, it might be counter-argued that these factor income 
payments represent a form of absorption nonetheless, with their attendant 
sterilization effects on domestic money supply (which is a concern for IFIs), 
and insofar as they need to be made anyways, they relieve the external 
constraints of the government or economy through one channel or another. 
However, this argument could equally be applied to the case of financial 
outflows, as any outflow could perform this sterilizing function, although this 
is generally not accepted given the principle that aid should increase domestic 
consumption or investment. As noted in the introduction, increased 
consumption operates through the trade account, not the income or other 
accounts.  
In this regard, Hussain et al do recognise the counteracting role of the 
financial account in aid absorption (see p. 497-500). However, they do not 
explore the reasons why increased aid flows might be related to increased 
financial outflows, beside short-term portfolio adjustments, but only conclude 
that more research is needed. This is ironic, coming from IMF economists, 
given that the tendency would have likely been accentuated by the increasing 
financial openness and international financial integration of developing 
countries over the noughties and teens, as has been advocated by IFIs. In 
particular, openness and integration has intensified the requirement to build 
reserves in the face of the increasing intensity and volatility of cross-border 
financial flows, as analysed by Akyüz (2015a). While this point is not discussed 
by Hussain et al, it does point towards a tension between different IFI tenets, 
e.g. between absorption for stabilisation versus non-absorption to meet the 
needs of reserve accumulation as a consequence of increasing financial account 
openness and exposure. The dissonance evidently exacerbates the incongruity 
faced by recipient countries in their management of aid and other flows under 
the yoke of IFI tutelage. 
A further problem that complicates estimates of absorption is the 
measurement of aid itself. Martins (2011) contends that the OECD DAC data 
is far from satisfactory because it is based on aid commitments but not actually 
disbursed aid, which is actually not precise because aid disbursement data are 
available at an aggregated country level from 1960 onwards, although not 
disaggregated by sector or other criteria, at least not until recently 
(disaggregated data on disbursements is now available from 2002 onwards). He 
also contends that much of the aid reported does not actually represent cross-
border financial transfers to the country per se, such as in cases of technical 
assistance, and instead advocates for the use of balance of payments data to 
gain a more accurate reflection of actual transfers. Again, this critique is not 
entirely valid given that, as noted above, IMF (2014) specifies that technical 
assistance actually is valued on the balance of payments of the recipient 
country as a transfer in kind, so the same critique also applies to this alternative 
data source. Serieux (2011) also notes that the DAC data include debt relief, 
which similarly does not involve any actual monetary transfers (although as 
noted above, it nonetheless frees up foreign exchange for other purposes and, 
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hence, has the equivalent effect, which is the reason why the DAC includes it). 
Again, debt relief is also included on the balance of payments as a form of 
exceptional financing and hence this issue is not resolved by this alternative 
data source.  
Instead, Martins (2011) adopts a measure of aid based on IMF balance 
of payments data in order to reflect actual inflows of aid reported by the 
receiving country (i.e. presumably official transfers within the current transfers 
account of the current account, or what is now referred to since BPM6 as 
international cooperation within the general government classification of the 
secondary income account). However, this restricts him to only grants and not 
concessional loans, which he admits later in the article (p.1932). He justifies his 
choice with the rational that concessional loans have different macroeconomic 
implications than grants. While this may be true in certain respects, it is not for 
considerations of absorption given that financial flows are also absorbed via 
trade deficits and official flows in particular are controlled by governments and 
therefore directly face the same absorption versus reserve accumulation 
calculus of choice. His choice therefore leaves out a huge part of aid in the 
absorption equation. Indeed, the same point could be made for other official 
flows that, although not concessional, can play a crucial role in buttressing 
development strategies, as discussed in the first section with respect to South 
Korea. Based on OECD data presented in Serieux (2011, p.1107), grants 
generally amounted to slightly more than half of aid flows to Sub-Saharan 
Africa from the 1970s onwards, besides in periods of debt relief (which is 
counted as grants), e.g. in the early 1990s and especially in 2006. Hence, on this 
basis, Martins’ estimate that two-thirds of aid was absorbed would be 
considerably lower if concessional loans were included, perhaps by close to 
half, especially once debt relief and technical assistance are deducted from the 
measure of actually disbursed grants, which would increase the share of loans 
in the DAC estimates. Hence, while Martins’ critique of the DAC data raises 
some important issues (some of which might not be fully justified), his 
alternative measure does not solve the problem, which renders his empirical 
results quite unreliable. 
These measurement issues are further complicated by the fact that 
tracing aid flows through various measures is actually quite difficult to do, 
given different categories of aid or channels of transmission. Off-budget forms 
of aid are one example, as discussed by Wuyts et al (2016) in the case of 
Tanzania, where project aid has continued alongside the emergence of 
programme aid since the mid-1980s, although no longer focused on supporting 
investment as in the past, but instead on poverty reduction. Similarly, while 
concessional lending in principle follows straightforward criteria, in practice it 
is notoriously difficult to distinguish within official lending given the 
complexity of such lending in terms of the variety of channels, the methods of 
reporting, and even whether concessionality was actually practiced even if 
contractually permitted. As argued above, even though non-concessional 
official flows are not counted as aid, they are nonetheless absorbed through the 
same macroeconomic mechanisms and can also support development in 
important ways, if only by providing counter-cyclical financing options, and 
should thus be included into a broader consideration of the absorption of 
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development finance. The roles played by exceptional financing are also very 
difficult to decipher in the balance of payments data and it is not clear to what 
extent it is included in DAC aid calculations, beyond obvious inclusions such 
as debt relief.20 These points reinforce the fact that Martins’ study hugely 
underestimates the numerator of aid in the calculation of absorption, especially 
if we consider official flows more broadly.  
Problems of data accuracy are an even more insidious challenge to the 
credibility of these absorption assessments, particularly in the case of 
regression analyses. To give a few simple examples, according to IMF balance 
of payments data (last accessed on 24 January 2017), Ethiopia was running a 
moderate current account deficit of 425 million USD in 2010, counterbalanced 
by a much stronger financial account surplus (an increase in net liabilities) of 
2,369 million USD, and yet the country was apparently drawing down its 
reserves by 865 million USD instead of accumulating them, which is explained 
by a deficit in the net errors and omissions of 2,930 million USD. Inversely, in 
2012, when the country was running a larger current account deficit of 2,985 
million USD, counterbalanced by a smaller inflow on the financial account of 
667 million USD, it was apparently accumulating 330 million USD of reserves, 
again explained by a 2,649 million USD surplus on the net errors and 
omissions. These examples are symptomatic of the balance of payments 
reporting of this country throughout the whole data range provided by the 
IMF, as they are of many other countries in Africa.  
Without entering into an analysis of what these errors and omission 
might represent, it is clear that anyone who claims to know the actual current 
and financial account positions of Ethiopia over these years is either ignorant 
or lying (or has access to Bank of Ethiopia data that is not reported to or by 
the IMF, although we would again need to question the reliability of even these 
data). More precisely, it is clear that the current account data do not provide 
reliable indicators of actual absorption of income or financial flows, or of the 
reasons why the country might be accumulating (or drawing down) foreign 
exchange reserves. The implications of net errors and omissions are entirely 
different depending on where the bulk of them are derived from, i.e. from the 
trade, income or financial accounts. Similarly, the accuracy of the fiscal data 
also needs to be questioned in relation to questions of spending, particularly 
that they are more immediate objects of political contestation and hence prone 
to manipulation, as in all countries. 
Hussain et al (2009) do acknowledge the problem of data accuracy, e.g. 
they admit in an endnote, p.508, that ‘large errors and omissions in the balance 
of payments accounts [of some countries] could be partly responsible for 
measured fluctuations in the capital account.’ However, they nonetheless 
present the aggregated non-aid current and financial account data as if there 
were no problem (p.499). They simply include the errors and omissions in the 
financial account, thereby assuming away the possibility that errors and 
20 According to current conventions, exceptional financing is consolidated in the IMF’s 
analytical presentation of balance of payments, distinct from the secondary income or financial 
accounts, but it is spread throughout diverse accounts in the standard presentation. 
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omissions might have been derived from the trade or income accounts. To 
give an example of the magnitude of the problem that they assume away, the 
net errors and omissions deficit of Ethiopia, one of their cases, was -915 
million USD in 2002, in the midst of the aid surge that they consider. This was 
greater than the goods deficit of -904 million USD in the same year. It was 
almost as large as the sum of the goods, services and primary income accounts 
(-992 million USD), which is more or less equivalent to the non-aid current 
account given that the secondary income account was dominated by (grant) aid 
flows. The net errors and omissions deficit might have represented unreported 
imports, enough of which might reverse the assessment of non-absorption of 
aid (based on the observation that the goods trade and non-aid current account 
deficits shrank in that year). However, it could equally represent unreported 
outflows on the income or financial accounts, which would support the hunch 
that the lack of aid absorption was instead facilitating illicit financial outflows 
(aka capital flight).  
In addition to this, there are even contradictory indications on reserve 
accumulation. The IMF BoP data show that Ethiopia was running down its 
reserves by 471 million USD in 2002 whereas the stock data in the IMF 
International Finance Statistics (IFS) show that total reserves minus gold 
actually increased by 449 million USD in the same year (Hussain et al 2009 
relied on the BoP data, indicating that reserves were falling). Notably, these 
contradictory indications on Ethiopian reserves from the two IMF data 
sources continue until the latest data available (2009 in the IFS data, as of 26 
January 2017).  
As a last point, it is also not clear how or to what extent the aid flow 
data include exceptional financing, as noted above. This amounted to a net 
inflow of 636 million USD in 2002, in contrast to 490 million USD of ODA 
according to the OECD DAC data base (last accessed 26 January 2017). Much 
of exceptional financing is presumably not counted as aid even though, in the 
Ethiopian case during these years as with many highly indebted poor countries 
(HIPCs), it constituted important and counter-cyclical official flows that 
apparently helped balance the external accounts.  
Given the magnitude of discrepancies and errors and omissions, any 
measure of absorption on both the numerator and denominator sides of the 
equation must be treated with many grains of salt. If aid absorption in this 
literature is significantly overestimated due the range of factors discussed 
above, the resultant low levels of absorption are controversial because they 
indicate that little net resource transfer or redistribution to a recipient country 
is effectively taking place. The argument that redistribution is taking place 
through reserve accumulation, as a form of saving for the future, is tenuous. 
Indeed, reserve accumulation in LICs in the noughties and teens has arguably 
been spurred by the increased vulnerability associated with deepening financial 
integration. This requires increased reserve accumulation in any case, whether 
through aid or through other sources, including commercial borrowing, as has 
been increasingly common (e.g. see Akyuz 2015a). Notably, when conditions 
turn bearish (as they are currently for most developing countries), such savings 
can be equally wiped out, particularly when countries are forced to defend their 
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currencies (such as Ghana in 2014 or Nigeria in 2015-16) thereby permanently 
removing this promise of future absorption from past aid savings. This is a 
point that Hussain et al (2009) overlook in their discussion of deferred 
absorption.  
Also, the lesser the aid absorption, the greater are the challenges of 
managing aid flows because of potentially greater mismatches between 
absorption and spending. Moreover, the likelihood that aid is not absorbed to 
any great extent, as appears to be systemically the case, reinforces the point 
made previously that aid is effectively not needed to finance domestic spending 
increases associated with aid. The equivalent can be more or less achieved 
through purely domestic monetary operations, with more policy autonomy 
although without the backing of adding foreign exchange. 
4   Elephants in the political economy of  aid literature 
Outside of the narrow specialized literature on the macroeconomics of aid, 
consideration of these monetary transformation dilemmas is simply non-
existent within the burgeoning academic and policy literatures on aid, even in 
the more general economics literature on aid. For instance, besides the 
theoretical modelling contribution by Berg et al (2015), balance of payments 
analyses are absent from the rest of the articles in a special issue of World 
Development in 2015 on the macroeconomic management of aid, including any 
recognition that absorption occurs via trade accounts.21 Such lacuna are 
characteristic of most of the aid effectiveness literature, including both critics 
and protagonists of aid, even though this literature is ironically dominated by 
economists, e.g. cf. Burnside and Dollar (2000), Easterly (2006), or Collier 
(2007), Sachs (2005),22 or Addison et al (2005). As a result, there is little or no 
discussion of the broader external structural conditions under which aid, or 
official flows more generally, might or might not prove to be effective under 
various macroeconomic circumstances. 
The politics related to these macroeconomic issues is therefore also 
barely recognized. The specialised macroeconomics literature does recognise 
that the macroeconomic management choices involved with aid are sensitive, 
albeit framed almost entirely in terms of political pressures on governments to 
spend aid regardless of whether or not it is absorbed (e.g. see Hussain et al 
2009, or else in terms of credibility issues during aid surges (e.g. see Buffie et al. 
21 Berg et al (2015) do little to address the conceptual and methodological issues discussed 
above, although they do offer a critique of the more orthodox position of Adam et al (2009) 
and Buffie et al (2010), who argue against the absorb and spend advice of the IMF, and instead 
for ‘fiscal restraint’. Buffie et al argue that recipient governments should use part of aid to pay 
down domestic government debt while conducting ‘reverse sterilisation’, based on the logic 
that the problem of aid surges that coincide with financial (‘capital’) outflows (or ‘flight’) rather 
than absorption is one that results from a credibility problem. 
22 Indeed, as noted earlier and in Fischer (2009), the savings-gap model promulgated by Sachs 
et al (2004) does not make the crucial distinction between foreign and domestic savings and 
thus proves irrelevant for understanding aid as foreign exchange.  
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2010). However, the actual politics involved in these or other issues are left 
mostly unexplored.  
Otherwise, in the rest of the literature, the focus has instead been on 
how ‘right’ economic policies or domestic governance influence aid 
effectiveness, or inversely, how aid undermines governance and, via this, 
economic performance. There is some more critical literature that examines 
power relations within aid. However, there is no discussion about how the 
monetary processes involved in transferring aid condition governance, 
effectiveness, or power relations. The lacuna amounts to a proverbial elephant 
in the aid literature, or else the finance for development literature more 
generally.  
The mainstream political economy literature in particular has been 
broadly influenced by the ‘good governance’ lens. It focuses on the questions 
of (domestic) governance, conceived as quality of domestic institutional 
environments and involving issues such as accountability, corruption, rent-
seeking, elite capture, and the divergence of resources away from their 
intended purposes. For instance, in her influential work on the effects of aid 
dependence on governance, Bräutigam (2000) argues that prolonged aid 
dependence can create incentives for governments and donors that potentially 
undermine good governance and the quality of state institutions. Knack (2001) 
similarly argues that aid dependence can potentially undermine institutional 
quality by a variety of political economy effects such as weakened 
accountability, rent seeking and corruption, conflict over control of aid funds, 
draining human resources from local bureaucracies, and alleviating pressures to 
reform. Bräutigam and Knack (2004) further explain this through a 
combination of transaction costs, fragmentation, and incentive and collective 
action problems that make it more difficult for elites to build capable and 
responsive states. A similar emphasis is also characteristic of work of Bill 
Easterly (e.g. 2006, 2014) or even Angus Deaton (2013), for instance, in terms 
of framing the distortive effects of aid in terms of domestic governance, with 
the understanding that domestic governance is the primary factor determining 
the effectiveness of aid and economic performance more generally. Notably, 
these contributions are focused on the domestic sphere of governance in 
donor-recipient relations, and in particular on how aid distorts domestic elite 
incentive structures, rather than examining how international governance 
conditions the distortive, disciplinary and even sometimes punitive roles of aid. 
In particular, despite the fact that much of this work has been written under 
the aegis of the World Bank, the monetary circuits of aid and the constraints 
that these might impose on government decision making and elite behaviour 
remain unexplored. 
This lens has subsequently influenced how issues have been framed in 
the ‘Paris Agenda’, referring to the series of donor declarations on aid 
effectiveness that started with the Paris Declaration in 2005. Bigsten and 
Tengstam (2015) categorise these into four: donor harmonisation; recipient 
country ownership of development priorities; alignment of aid flows with these 
priorities; and transparency and accountability. Despite its absence from these 
issues, the dilemma of monetary transformation from external to domestic 
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resources is nonetheless relevant precisely because the monetary constraints 
involved might exacerbate donor concerns regarding transparency and thereby 
counteracting attempts of exercise principles of country ownership, as 
discussed further below. Indeed, these underlying tensions implicit in current 
aid agendas can help shed light on some of the convoluted and often 
contradictory meanings and practices of the principle of ownership, as 
discussed by Whitfield and Fraser (2009), Booth (2011) and Esser (2014). 
Similar tensions underlie recent academic debates on the issue of 
fungibility, that is, the degree to which aid disbursed for use in certain sectors 
such as health and education is matched by government expenditure in those 
sectors (cf. Lu et al 2010; Harper 2012; Van de Sijpe 2013; Dieleman et al 2014; 
and Morrissey 2015). Fungibility in this sense is an important element in donor 
concerns about transparency, which is generally used in reference to recipient 
government transparency rather than donor transparency (e.g. see Bigsten and 
Tengstam 2015). However, none of these contributions consider the inherent 
monetary fungibility of foreign aid destined for domestic spending and how 
this might problematize conceptualisations of both fungibility and 
transparency, as discussed in the previous section. Indeed, in most of the 
fungibility literature, the matching of domestic sectoral spending with aid 
disbursements is not considered within the wider macroeconomic context of 
absorption, which is problematic given that increased spending in one area 
could be compensated by reduced spending in others, as is indeed often 
encouraged by donors, such as with the ongoing advocacy by the World Bank 
and other IFIs to fund cash transfers by removing various price subsidies.  
The lacuna is reproduced in the social protection literature. For 
instance, Armando Barrientos has emphasised that aid should not be used to 
finance regular expenditures within social assistance programmes in developing 
countries given that this encourages a situation whereby such programmes do 
not become regular expenditure items on government budgets, undermining 
their long-term sustainability (see Barrientos 2013: chapter seven). He builds 
his argument on theories from the political economy of taxation regarding the 
behavioural responses of economic agents to the incentives generated by 
different forms of financing. However, he does not consider the 
transformation dilemma implied by the option of using aid to finance social 
assistance provided in domestic currency, even though this would arguably 
provide for a more primary rational in support of his contention, even before 
accounting for domestic incentive issues. Indeed, his equally sceptical view of 
the potential for global taxes or natural resource rents to fund social assistance 
is based on a similar assessment of incentive problems, whereas the monetary 
constraints discussed here would also support his scepticism given that such 
taxes and rents are generally denominated in foreign currency, and hence face 
comparable transformation dilemmas. Similarly, the recent work by Holmqvist 
(2012) on the external financing of social protection also ignores this monetary 
transformation dimension despite being so central to the topic he writes about. 
Instead, he offers a detailed discussion on questions of the magnitude of 
financing required, aid modalities, the adverse impacts that aid can have on 
institutional development and domestic accountability, and various approaches 
to conditionality that have been devised or theorised to deal with such 
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adversities, without considering the monetary complexities of how such 
external financing might be absorbed and transferred to social protection 
sectors in the first place.  
This monetary dimension is also absent from the otherwise innovative 
work on financing social policy led by UNRISD (e.g. see Hujo and 
McClanahan 2009, particularly the relevant chapters by Ortiz 2009 and 
Morrissey 2009), or else to other work in the policy literature on how aid might 
finance social protection (cf. UNRISD 2010; ERD 2010; DFID 2011; Garcia 
and Moore 2012). In relation to the work produced under the auspices of 
UNRISD, Bangura (2015) argues, like Barrientos, that social services and 
protection are central to the building of effective revenue bargains between 
governments and citizens and, as such, should be the exclusive preserve of 
domestic politics, whereas the funding of these sectors with aid risks short-
circuiting this domestic bargain building and thereby ‘the construction of 
effective state capacity in advancing the project of economic transformation.’ 
What is notable from the perspective presented in this paper is that the case of 
not financing these social expenditures through aid or other external resources 
is strengthened precisely because such domestic expenditures are mostly 
denominated in domestic currencies and cannot be directly financed by aid in 
any case, except in the case of sectors such as health that have a high import 
content, as noted previously. The extent to which external finance is actually 
able to fund such policies – versus representing the credit side within complex 
negotiated processes between donors and recipients about domestic spending 
commitments – is an enormous blind spot in this literature, despite its 
underlying political economy approach. 
4.1 Of convolutions and compulsions 
The monetary as well as fiscal implications involved in the transformation 
from foreign to domestic resources effectively involves a terrain of intensely 
politicized debates and power struggles within donor-recipient relations, as well 
as within donor organisations and recipient countries themselves. This includes 
complex and politicised negotiations among networks of actors operating 
within often starkly asymmetrical power relations. The problem is that, in 
ignoring contestations over how aid actually gets disbursed and the complex 
and obscure negotiated processes by which disbursements actually manifest as 
domestic spending, many of the issues identified in the extant political 
economy literature are arguably better understood as symptoms of a broader 
balancing act between foreign exchange needs and donor expectations rather 
than as causes of poor aid effectiveness per se.  
This distinction becomes particularly important when international 
conditions facing recipient countries become more bearish and austere, hence 
reviving the spectre of balance of payment constraints and crises, as witnessed 
in the swath of currency crises that hit many developing countries from 2013 
onwards, after a decade of abundant foreign finance that led many to assume 
that such risks had ended. Notably, the ending of the boom cycle has been 
partly the result of monetary tapering in the US and the related unwinding of 
the commodity booms in oil and mining that also drove much foreign 
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investment – both productive and speculative – to many of these ‘emerging 
markets.’ However, balance of payments constraints have also been 
simultaneously compounded by the import-intensity of most developing 
country economies and hence the emergence of current account deficits 
precisely as a reflection of accelerated economic growth, as discussed in the 
first section. This global context is important from a political angle because, as 
noted in the introduction, it augments the leverage of donors as strategic 
providers of concessional finance to countries that face these stringent balance 
of payments constraints, even in situations where aid might only amount to a 
marginal addition to overall external and domestic financing needs. The fact 
that donor positions might nonetheless result in a variety of contradictory and 
convoluted demands on recipient country governments could result in 
appearances of poor governance among the latter, which as noted, would 
amount to symptoms even though generally attributed as causes.  
A few examples help to illustrate this last point that donors might, in 
many cases, give contradictory signals with regard to the management of aid 
flows, quite possibly emanating from different departments within even the 
same IFI. One is with regard to the tension on the absorption side, as already 
noted above, between the advocacy of absorption by the IMF and other IFIs, 
versus their general advocacy of financial account liberalisation. The latter in 
fact accentuates the necessity to accumulate reserves, hence encouraging this 
rather than absorption. This is especially notable in countries running current 
account deficits and yet that accumulate reserves via external borrowing, as 
discussed by Akyüz (2015a).  
On the spending side, there is also a tension between increased 
spending versus explicit or implicit endorsements of fiscal restraint or even 
austerity in certain contexts (especially if we increase the remit of aid to include 
other official flows more generally, which are often less restrained in their use 
of conditionalities to enforce austerity). A good example of this is precisely 
found in the social protection agenda lobbied by large multilateral donors such 
as the World Bank. On one hand, the Bank has played a leading role in 
pressuring countries to adopt and expand cash transfer schemes, whether 
through means of direct programme financing or else as a conditionality within 
broader aid packages, as has been common in the HIPC approval process 
overseen by the IMF and related PRSPs. However, as part of these same 
processes, the same IFIs have explicitly linked the expansion of cash transfers 
to the removal of price subsidies, such as in food, fertilisers and other inputs, 
fuel and energy, which has been a long-standing tension between these IFIs 
and many developing countries. The latter policy position has been much 
debated despite the apparent orthodox consensus that price subsidies are 
inherently bad policy. However, an added implication of this explicit 
association is that the net effect, if implemented, does not increase overall 
spending, precisely because the expansion of social protection spending is 
proposed to occur in a substitutive rather than additive manner, reallocating 
expenditures from one budget line to another (see Fischer 2012 for some 
discussion of this in terms of social policy more generally). This is especially 
the case in circumstances where the fiscal weight of subsidies is much greater 
than cash transfers, as is common in African countries.  
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The irony is that an explicit substitutive approach to aid-associated 
spending would probably be criticised by the sections of the IMF that advocate 
for the full spending of aid. It might also run up against concerns regarding 
fungibility, if those concerned with fungibility would indeed examine such 
issues in a more systemic manner (which it appears they do not). The 
implications would also equally come under critical (and justifiable) scrutiny of 
the recipient government (and their informed constituencies), especially if it 
appears that much of the aid is not absorbed in any case. Indeed, this might 
partly explain why there has been so much resistance from governments, 
particularly in Africa, to remove subsidies.23 In the face of such contradictory 
signals from donors and the contortions that a government must undergo as a 
consequence in order to appease various contending pressures, it is 
understandable how the said government could appear to be somewhat 
dysfunctional in the balancing act. This in turn encourages a self-fulfilling focus 
among both donors and academics on domestic governance issues as 
explanations for poor performance in the presence of large aid inflows, 
especially if resistance to the elimination of subsidies is tautologically 
interpreted as an indication of bad governance or policy.  
In addition to such contradictory signals, transfers from foreign to 
domestic resources arguably exacerbate donor concerns about fungibility, 
transparency and accountability given that they are indirect, opaque, 
negotiated, and generally in disequilibrium (with respect to absorption and 
spending). This is especially the case given that most staff in both aid agencies 
and recipient governments would not understand the complexities of the 
processes involved, besides those who are directly involved with the technical 
aspects of such transfers.  
Such concerns potentially lead donors to seek ways of bypassing the 
long route of accountability through the financial circuit and instead to 
strengthen their control over the end uses of aid. In other words, the idea that 
donors do fund domestic expenditures would appear relevant to them to the 
degree that they are able to control these domestic policies or else retain 
control over the domestic currency. This would therefore accentuate impulses 
23 More broadly, such subsidy policies are often treated as social protection expenditures by 
African governments. As was pointed out to me in conversation with Thandika Mkandawire, 
they generally cover much wider sections of the population than most cash transfer 
programmes, result from long and hard fought distributive struggles, and often include 
important cross-class dynamics that, in the social policy literature, are considered to be 
beneficial for the cultivation of more universalistic approaches of welfare and citizenship. 
Subsidy policies also often contribute to more production-oriented development strategies, 
although this runs against orthodoxy in the IFIs, which continue to insist that subsidies 
represent an inefficient and ineffective use of resources that would be better targeted to the 
poor, and hence their emphasis of refining targeting systems rather than broadening and 
unifying publically funded social protection systems. See discussion of this in the seminal paper 
by Mkandawire (2005); for an alternative consideration in the case of Iran, see Meskoub 
(2015). As was pointed out to me by Dwayne Woods, it is also ironic that the attribution of 
rent seeking is actually not at all obvious in the case of subsidies, given that these are 
generalised and thus cannot be controlled in a particularistic manner, versus cash transfers that 
can, despite the fact that the opposite is generally asserted, i.e. that subsidies are an indication 
of neopatrimonialism whereas cash transfers undermine this.  
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among donors to strengthen their influence in the sphere of domestic politics 
and policy making in recipient countries, including through explicit and implicit 
conditionalities such as those subsumed under Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers, in order to guarantee that disbursed aid actually translates into 
domestic expenditures (given the tenuous links between the two in such 
contexts, in contrast to traditional aid that was more explicitly connected to 
foreign exchange needs). Indeed, it is notable that the social protection agenda 
is often pursued by IFIs as a conditionality of structural adjustment 
programmes, stand-by loans, or debt relief agreements, rather than as an object 
of specific project or sector-specific programme financing. Or, as noted by 
Winther-Schmidt (2011), aid for social protection is often subsumed under 
general budget support.24 While this facilitates its macroeconomic 
management, it also exacerbates concerns over accountability, thereby stoking 
the impulse to impose conditionalities. These donor concerns might also 
encourage the alternative impulse among donors to increase off-budget aid 
spending (as has been observed in some cases, e.g. see Wuyts et al 2016 in the 
case of Tanzania), or else to increase the foreign exchange component in the 
aid earmarked for social expenditures, typically through channelling aid 
towards technical assistance or consultancy services, such as on issues of 
improving efficiency of targeting, etc.  
The recent policy advocacy of a ‘cash-on-delivery’ approach to aid 
disbursement by Birdsall and Savedoff (2010), or of the ‘payment by results’ 
strategy announced by DFID in 2014 (DFID 2014), might be understood as 
expressions of such impulses. The aim of such approaches is to strengthen the 
enforcement of donor control over negotiated and contracted agreements with 
recipient governments, by providing stronger tools of compliance in the end 
uses of aid. Further research on these strategies is required given that they are 
quite new (see some initial assessments in Chambers 2014 and Clist 2016). 
However, according to the framework discussed here, these policy innovations 
can be understood as part of a third wave of implicit conditionalities applied at 
an increasingly micro level, the first wave referring to SAPs and the 
Washington Consensus in 1980s and the second to those of the post-
Washington consensus, good governance and the institutional emphasis in aid 
policy, as discussed in the second section. The third wave represents a further 
extension of explicit or implicit conditionalities into a greater range of 
domestic political arenas beyond the institutions related to economic policy, in 
this case including social policy.  
These dynamics and implications are not exclusive to the specific case 
of aid directed towards social expenditures, although such aid provides a 
particularly poignant lens through which to examine some of these underlying 
24 Winther-Schmidt (2011, p.4) notes that ‘many bilateral institutions channel much of their 
support to social protection as unearmarked core contributions through multilateral agencies 
such as the ILO, UN, EU and the WB, which makes it difficult to quote the exact bilateral 
contributions in this area…’ and that ‘…social protection projects and programmes are often 
part of larger financial packages that are allocated at sector level and cut across several policy 




                                                 
power relations and subtle forms of coercion embedded within the current aid 
system. In this sense, the donor emphasis of social protection might be 
understood as serving a further intensification of the trend started in the 1990s 
within the so-called ‘Post Washington Consensus’ of extending the 
conditionalities of structural adjustment policies in the 1980s to include new 
forms of implicit political conditionality, rather than representing a shift away 
from the traditional macroeconomic conditionalities (which are generally still 
subsumed within the broader range of conditionalities in any case). As argued 
by Shadlen (2002) with regard to the Post Washington Consensus, this would 
represent not so much a shift away from the ‘monoeconomics’ of 
neoliberalism, as per the use of this term by Hirschman (1981), but instead an 
extension of mono-ism towards a broader remit of ‘mono-politics-and-
economics.’ In this sense, donor emphasis of social protection might be 
understood as reinforcing this institutional subordination of recipient countries 
within donor-recipient power relations, despite commitments to the contrary 
of respecting national ‘ownership’ under the Paris Agenda.  
From the recipient side, the obfuscation related to the increasing 
emphasis of domestic expenditures similarly might exacerbate various tensions 
and power struggles at the domestic level. For instance, as donors weigh into 
the domestic political context, they often side with different ministries and 
even seek to dislocate conventional ministerial hierarchies, such as by 
bypassing finance ministries and attempting to empower social welfare 
ministries, which have traditionally been the much weaker junior partner (e.g. 
see a discussion of this by Hickey et al 2009 with regard to DFID policy). 
Indeed, the latter are often identified by the new trend of so called political 
economy analysis by donors as the domestic champions of particular donor 
agendas, while identifying finance ministries as bastions of resistance. 
Resistance might be due to more conservative (anti-welfare) or monetarist 
(anti-expansionary spending) biases, or perhaps simply because the executive 
has different views on the preferred development agenda to prioritize. The 
ministry prioritized by donors nonetheless comes to also have vested interests 
in pursuing the donor agenda, particularly if donors have managed to negotiate 
direct financing that bypasses finance ministries. Tensions would therefore be 
accentuated between various ministries and their competing and often 
conflicting spending priorities, in terms of how fiscal spending is transferred 
through various line ministries and operating budgets, or even outside of them, 
such as with off-budget aid or with aid directed towards supporting service 
provisioning by non-governmental organisations. 
5   Conclusion 
While many of these issues require further research, the monetary 
transformation dilemma nonetheless opens up an original front of research, 
asking important questions that have been thus far been neglected in the 
political economy literatures dealing with aid, social protection, and the 
financing of development more generally. In essence, the extent to which 
official flows are actually able to fund domestic expenditures involves a range 
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of macroeconomic management concerns that are prone to exacerbate the 
already thorny political relations between donors and recipient governments. 
This calls for a serious rethink of many of the accepted premises in the existing 
literatures, particularly with respect to the dominant focus on domestic 
governance rather than a broader systemic understanding of the often 
convoluted and contradictory dynamics influencing both external and domestic 
actors.  
Several examples have been highlighted in this paper. First, 
conventional measures of absorption, as used by the IMF and associated 
authors, are highly problematic given that they rely on aggregated current 
account data that includes income payments to foreigners, such as interest 
payments on debt and profit remittances. Second, mismatches between the 
absorption and notional domestic spending of aid appear to be the norm in 
most of the countries studied in the macroeconomic literature on aid, even 
more so once the first point above is taken into consideration, as well as 
broader definitions of aid and even other official flows. Third, the full 
absorption and spending of aid, as advocated by the IMF, is in contradiction 
with the need to accumulate reserves in the face of financial account 
liberalisations, as also advocated by the IMF and other IFIs.  Fourth, the full 
spending of aid is similarly in contradiction with substitutive approaches to 
social protection, as commonly advocated by donors and IFIs, which imply no 
net increase in spending. Lastly, the obscurity of these monetary 
transformation dilemmas result in a strong propensity to exacerbate donor 
concerns about fungibility, transparency and accountability, thereby inciting 
donors to seek ways of strengthening their micro-control over the end uses of 
aid, as exemplified by recent trends in aid modalities such as cash-on-delivery 
or payment by results.  
Impulses to control recipient countries obviously do not originate from 
these tensions, but have long standing roots in colonial and post-colonial 
histories, especially since the neoliberal phase of structural adjustment 
programmes and beyond. However, the tensions associated with the 
obfuscating effects of the monetary transformation dilemma nonetheless 
reinforce the broader ideological predilections to subordinate recipient 
countries with donor-recipient power relations, in parallel with increasingly 
conservative reactions to welfare in donor countries, thereby running counter 
to donor commitments of respecting national ownership. 
This rethinking is particularly urgent given the currently tightening 
financial cycle facing developing countries, as witnessed by the swath of 
currency crises in 2013 and 2014, the wider systemic devaluations in 2015, and 
the re-emergence of stringent balance of payments constraints facing many 
developing countries. This in turn raises the need for concessional external 
financing while simultaneously reinforcing the leverage of donors as strategic 
providers of such finance, even in situations where aid might only amount to a 
marginal addition to overall external and domestic financing needs. This is 
occurring and in an orthodox ideological climate in which the mainstream 
consensus default response to crisis continues to be austerity and structural 
adjustment in order to achieve both primary fiscal surpluses as well as trade 
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surpluses, while the private financial markets that increasingly dominate so-
called development financing continue to penalise developing countries for 
running fiscal and trade deficits. At the same time, current international 
development agendas (e.g. the MDGs and now the SDGs) have increasingly 
emphasised the priority of directing international aid towards social 
expenditures, even though such expenditures could in principle be financed 
domestically if aid recipient countries were unconstrained to practice 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policy.  
In this context, recipient governments must play a taut balancing act of 
preserving policy space between foreign exchange needs on one hand and 
donor concerns about fungibility and transparency in domestic expenditures 
on the other. In this manner, the tension between these tendencies, as 
highlighted by the monetary transformation dilemma, might in fact bolster the 
disciplinary and punitive roles of donors, while restricting the policy space of 
recipient countries despite donor commitments of respecting national 
ownership under the Paris Agenda of aid effectiveness. 
Ultimately, the monetary transformation dilemma goes to the heart of the 
question of how to (re)construct a more effective aid system and an 
international financial architecture that are genuinely redistributive towards the 
poorest countries and in ways that do not undermine national self-
determination or reinforce structural dependency. Indeed, while the focus here 
has been on social expenditures, the analytical insights could also be 
transferred to other important issues on the global agenda such as climate 
financing, insofar as these also involve the domestic absorption of external 
financial resources as an important consideration. 
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